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With little doubt, the 21st century will be remembered mainly for the role China plays 
in it. Decades of unprecedented economic growth has been an endless source of workers 
and later customers for investors all across the world. China is currently the second-
largest economy in the world and has increasingly begun investing overseas itself. 
However, China is a single-party state, with a large state-owned sector dominating large 
parts of the economy. This has caused concern in the European Union about the 
influence China might gain through investing in European countries. Furthermore, 
China has been very protective of its domestic industries, which is seen as an unfair 
advantage for Chinese companies over their European competitors. This study focuses 
on the challenges that EU FDI regulation faces because of China. 
The European FDI regulation has been created in a fundamentally different world, 
where all major investors are similar, free market based liberal democracies with rule of 
law. The emergence of a fundamentally different system on a massive scale, like China 
upsets this premise and forces strategic considerations to be taken into account when 
regulating FDIs. China is both a blessing and a curse for the EU. The Chinese markets 
are vital for European industry but at the same time, the EU fears China´s growing 
influence over its member states and of being taken advantage of by the comparably 
free access given to Chinese investors into the EU markets and the lack of transparency 
in Chinese investment activities. 
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1. Research Methods 
In this thesis, I study how the People’s Republic of China becoming a global economic 
superpower affects the economic and political landscape in which the foreign direct 
investment regulation of Finland, and by extension the European Union, must operate, 
and what regulatory measures are being taken in response. Understanding the historical 
development, and the main political and economic features that make China special are 
important from the legal standpoint when considering the regulation of foreign 
investments. In the case of China, the political implications are inherently tied to the 
nature of its legal system as it is referred to as 法治 (Fǎzhì), which means “rule of law” 
but is usually translated to “rule by law” in English. Rule by law is defined as follows: 
“Instead of being a supreme and objective standard in its own right, the law is an 
instrument to be wielded by the party and the government in exercise and preservation of 
the authority.”1 
The geopolitical confrontation between China and the United States revolves heavily 
around the legal treaty network that governs our modern world and legal study on the 
effects of the rise of China and the growth of its influence abroad, from a European 
perspective, is warranted. This is a study on how the rise of China’s economic might 
affects the legal framework that constitutes the liberal and democratic principles of the 
European Union and what kind of legal measures the EU is adopting to counter the 
growing Chinese influence. To understand the complexity of the subject and the effects 
of China’s economic power, China and the historical context behind global economic 
                                                 




order must be understood to some extent. I will start this thesis with a brief overlook of 
the relative developments from the 19th century onwards, progressively focusing on more 
recent developments.  
The methodology of the thesis is pluralistic in nature and relies on legal positivism and 
legal realism. It is partly interdisciplinary as I take into account the underlying economic 
and political reasoning to gain a better understanding of the nature of the legal framework 
governing foreign direct investments. For that part, I use macroeconomic FDI theory and 
its modern geopolitical implications to scrutinise country-specific factors in both 
outbound FDI activities and the treatment of inward FDI.2 I find this approach mandated 
as changes in international politics or economic turmoil may require quick alterations to 
the existing policies and a certain level of flexibility from the law, so it is more rapidly 
applicable in a new and changing environment. 
I address the challenges posed to the lawmakers seeking to amend legislation to conform 
to the challenges of the changing global economic order. I map out the general legal basis 
for investment restrictions on foreign investors in general and how they can be 
specifically targeted towards a specific country and how this approach conforms with the 
protections granted by international treaties. I also note the main Chinese legislation in 
this field due it reciprocal nature and several other forms of investment activities in the 
European Union, especially those related to the Belt and Road Initiative. I will focus on 
the political and economic factors that shape the legal requirements of European FDI 
regulation and the foreseeable developments in this field. The scope of the thesis will 
include the different types of Chinese investments, the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment, which is being negotiated currently between the European Union and China, 
                                                 




and the political and economic factors that shape the legal environment around foreign 
assets and free markets. 
I will use standards and definitions from several international organisations, some of 
which China is not a member of, like the OECD, but since OECD is composed of most 
of the major economies in the world, it provides reliable data on the global economy and 
its statistics are useful to give scope for the subject of this study. I also focus on the “de 
lege ferenda” aspect regarding incoming investments from China into the European 
Union. I focus my study on the national legislation and treaty system of Finland, which 
includes the laws of the European Union. There is still a crossover between national 
jurisdiction and EU jurisdiction, even though the Lisbon Treaty assigns the sole 
competence over trade policy to the European Union. The main source of upcoming 
regulation is the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment and various EU directives 
regarding Foreign Direct Investments and foreign state subsidies. 
2.  Introduction 
In the past four decades, the People’s Republic of China has risen from extreme poverty 
and isolationism into being the second-largest economy in the world after the United 
States. Nobody expected such a spectacular rise from a nation that was on a verge of 
collapse after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. China had just endured a gruelling decade 
of chaos and anarchy of the cultural revolution when the reformer faction led by Deng 
Xiaoping wrested the control of the Communist Party from the Gang of Four. In the 
subsequent decades of economic reform, China has come to rival the global influence of 




war balance of power in the world, which will constitute one of the major challenges of 
the 21st century.3 
2.1. Brief History of Recent Globalisation 
As globalisation has made the world economies more integrated and inter-dependent, and 
as large scale investments and assets in foreign countries give other countries a stake in 
the prosperity of other nations, the common argument goes that this makes the world 
much safer and less prone to aggressive competition between countries. This argument, 
however, omits the scope of influence that a large economy, such as China or the US, can 
wield over smaller economies by investing heavily in critical sectors of the economy. An 
analogy can be drawn to the late 19th-century practice of the European colonial powers, 
who often did not conquer their vast colonial empires by the sword, but gradually 
increased their influence through treaties with local populations followed by investing in 
infrastructure and natural resources and finally by gradually taking over the civilian and 
military control of the region, while justifying their actions by the need to protect such 
investments.4 
Also, it is noteworthy to remember that by summer 1914 most of the world was divided 
under western spheres of influence and that the global economy was already heavily 
globalised and intertwined. In 1909 Norman Angell wrote his famous book, The Great 
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4 Foreman-Peck, James. “Foreign Investment and Imperial Exploitation: Balance of Payments 
Reconstruction for Nineteenth-Century Britain and India.” The Economic History Review, vol. 42, no. 





Illusion. In his book, he argues that the economic interdependence of the Great Powers is 
the real guarantor of the good behaviour of one state to another5 and that the economic 
aspects make war between industrial nations irrational and impossible. While he was 
certainly correct on the irrationality of the ensuing first world war, he was sorely mistaken 
about its possibility as the first disastrous half of the 20th-century shows. 
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British Empire exercised military interventions in 
numerous foreign countries for economic reasons under the “casus belli” of protecting 
British interests, such as British investments and other business interests abroad. The most 
famous example of these wars were the opium wars, which led to humiliating defeats for 
the Chinese, the cession of Hong Kong and the opening of numerous treaty ports across 
China, in which, under the guise of protecting their investments, the colonial powers were 
granted extraterritorial rights. This period of European supremacy is not forgotten in 
Chinese history but known by a rather thought-provoking term: “The Century of 
Humiliation”.67 The Chinese see their recent rise to the world’s stage, not as anything 
new, but as a return to their historical position as the centre of the world. After all, before 
the industrial revolution, China had for centuries been economically the most prosperous 
region in the world. 
The second world war had left Europe in ruins and the US single-handedly the largest 
economy on the planet accounting for almost half of the world’s gross domestic product. 
After the war, the United States sought to create a free-market based trading system under 
its leadership. The old colonial powers of Europe were nearly bankrupt and heavily 
indebted to the US and were forced to dismantle their preferential trading blocs built 
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7 The Century of Humiliation is usually seen to have lasted from the First Opium War in 1840 until the 




around their colonial empires as part of the terms for receiving financial aid from the 
United States in the form of the Marshall Plan. The beginning of this new western 
economic system can be placed in 1947 when 23 countries signed the General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in Geneva. GATT aims to promote free trade internationally 
by reducing tariffs and other trade barriers. The network of treaties that ensued 
culminating in the formation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) aimed at creating 
a global trade system with integrated economies and common rules on international trade 
and movement of capital, leading to a more prosperous, peaceful and accountable 
economic world.  Similarly, the founding of OECD, the economic co-operation 
organisation of the developed western countries has been instrumental in shaping the 
post-world war two global economy. China is not a member of the OECD but as its 
members command most of the global GDP, its policies have had a global influence.8 
Thanks to its large industry, vast resources and sizeable population the US has greatly 
benefited from this system as it has opened more markets for US-manufactured goods. In 
addition to the aforementioned perks, its business culture and innovativeness has kept it 
ahead of everyone else and consecutively its economic power has made it the most 
influential country in world affairs, so it has been in the US’ interest geopolitically to 
promote free trade and market-based economies world-wide. The US has not had any 
serious competition since the rivalling socialist treaty system fell in the late 1980s until 
China’s unprecedented economic growth started challenging the US in the 21st century.9 
                                                 







The global economic integration created unprecedented growth in foreign investments. 
Corporations started outsourcing their production into countries with cheaper labour costs 
or their target markets to circumvent any remaining tariffs and to cut overseas export 
costs. Western businesses invested heavily in China when it started opening up by 
financing infrastructure projects and opening up factories in hopes of profiting from cheap 
Chinese labour and gaining access to massive Chinese markets.10 Consequently, China 
grew richer and stronger and the Chinese gained massive amounts of excess capital, and 
they in turn started looking for investment opportunities around the world. Flourishing 
Chinese businesses bought out their competitors in the West, rich individuals invested in 
the booming housing markets of large European cities. Huge investments in European 
infrastructure, such as harbours help to integrate Europe deeper into Chinese export 
markets.11 
2.2. Foreign Direct Investments in the Global Economy 
After the end of the cold war, the US became the world’s sole superpower and the 
booming technology industry in the Silicon Valley in the 1990s and early 2000’s made it 
a global technology leader, a position which currently is challenged by emerging Chinese 
technology companies, most visibly by Huawei.12 The US sees China as a threat to its 
global dominance across the board, from military to trade and technology and it has set 
                                                 
10 Walter, Howe. Red Capitalism, p. 8-16 
11 Compatible Interests? The EU and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Svante E. Cornell, Niklas 
Swanström (Accessed 10 December 2020) 
https://isdp.eu/publication/compatible-interests-the-eu-and-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative/ 







out to limit the increasing Chinese influence over the world. The European Union is 
traditionally closely aligned with the US and has also grown worried about ever-
increasing Chinese influence within the Union primarily gained through economic ties 
and growing Chinese ownership in European industries. Chinese investments in some 
European countries during the euro crisis made Chinese investors large owners of crucial 
industries and major employers in countries like Greece and Portugal which in turn gives 
China political influence within the EU.13 
The presidency of Donald Trump, the partial return of US isolationism and the trade war 
with China has caused a rift between the EU and the US, leaving the EU to seek a more 
independent course in the world. Prominent European leaders such as the French 
president Emmanuel Macron and the German chancellor Angela Merkel have both called 
for a greater independent role for the EU in international matters.14 The European Union 
has always relied on trans-Atlantic partnership and with the US showing signs of 
withdrawing from it, many in the EU have turned to strengthen ties with China, although 
the attitudes towards China remain complex and politically volatile. 
European and Finnish regulation is traditionally very open and welcoming towards 
foreign investment for its economy-boosting effect and consequently, it is a field that is 
very lightly regulated or limited. Recently European policymakers have scrambled to 
reinterpret laws and regulations so that they could use the existing legal framework to 
hamper unwanted investments from China and deny access to certain sectors of European 
markets form Chinese corporations. This includes giving a broader interpretation to such 
                                                 
13 Plamen Tonchev, Polyxeni Davarinou, Chinese Investment in Greece and the Big Picture of Sino-
Greek Relations, December 2017, p. 56 
14 Europe cannot rely on US and faces life without UK, says Merkel. Financial Times 28 May 2017 





terms as “national security” or “vital national interest”, grounds on which local 
regulations and international treaties allow blocking foreign access to domestic markets. 
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has also raised concerns over over-reliance on the 
sustainability of global supply chains in crises, which has given a broader meaning for 
national security in regards to domestic production and foreign ownership. The Finnish 
Government intensified the screening of foreign acquisitions in the Finnish private health 
sector. The European Union has grown wary of foreign actors taking advantage of 
European crises and economic downturns. A report by Rhodium Group and the Mercator 
Institute for China Studies noted that Chinese investors targeted strategic commodities in 
European markets during previous economic crises in Europe.15  
The European Union has also started adopting a stricter approach to China and inward 
investments from China. After decades of seduction by the ever more lucrative Chinese 
markets and warming relations, the EU labelled China as a “systemic rival” in March 
201916 and accused it of using “its model of state capitalism to achieve industrial and 
technological supremacy, all the while taking advantage of Europe’s open market 
economy.”17 This change in policy towards China is a part of the larger geopolitical shift 
described earlier. The openness of the European Union, long heralded as one of the 
greatest achievements of the political union, has proved to be also one of its greatest 
weaknesses vulnerable to be exploited by outside state actors. This presents a major shift 
                                                 
15 A report by Rhodium Group (RHG) and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), Chinese 
FDI in Europe 2019 Update, April 2020, p. 14 
https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/MERICSRhodium%20GroupCOFDIUpdate2020.pdf  
16 European Commission, EU-China – A strategic outlook, 17 March 2019 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-china-a-strategic-outlook.pdf  





to a more protectionist stance in the EU, a move that was almost unthinkable just a decade 
ago. 
China has long been one of the largest recipients of FDI in the world thanks to its vast 
markets and huge labour pool. The Chinese market has become vital for many European 
companies, such as German carmakers and many fashion brands. This dependency has 
given China a huge influence in the West as angering the Communist Party might have 
severe economic consequences for local businesses operating in China, as can be seen in 
the case of Norway after a Chinese dissident was awarded the Nobel peace prize, which 
caused a six-year freeze in bilateral political relations with Norway and the PRC, and saw 
some decline in overall trade and investment activities between the countries.18 
3. The Chinese Dilemma 
China is fast developing its industry and high tech production capabilities are beginning 
to rival western industrial countries and this has been met with increasing concern over 
its potential consequences.19 A prime example of success in this regard is Huawei, 
which’s the market share of the emerging 5G technologies has raised alarm during the 
past few years. The US has grown concerned about China’s rise to the world stage and 
recently this has manifested itself in how suspiciously the US treats Huawei. The US has 
                                                 
18 Chinese Investment in Europe A Country-Level Approach, p.108, December 2017 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_reports_2017_final_20dec2017.pdf 
19 MERICS, Made in China 2025, The making of a high-tech superpower and consequences for industrial 






issued sanctions on Huawei and has used its influence to make its allies within the 
European Union to follow suit. The escalating trade war and embargo on Huawei has put 
the EU on the fence between the US and China.20 
In 2013 China launched its famous Belt and Road initiative, which ceremoniously is 
branded as the reopening of the ancient silk road. The Belt and Road initiative is a multi-
trillion-dollar infrastructure development project across Eurasia and Africa. Besides its 
economic aspects, China sees the Belt and Road Initiative strategically imperative to 
ensure the protection of the vital sea routes, on which China depends upon, and by 
investing in overland infrastructure, to lessen its reliance on access to the sea. China sees 
itself at the mercy of the US as its navy and allies surround China’s coast from all 
directions.21 This has contributed to rising tensions and China’s aggressive posturing in 
the region. In a possible conflict situation, China wants to avoid the fate of Germany in 
the First World War when the UK effectively shut Germany off from the rest of the world 
and starved it into submission. On the other hand, the Belt and Road Initiative might prove 
an opportunity for the EU to seize upon,22 increasing mutually beneficial co-operation 
with China as infrastructure developments across Eurasia and subsequent economic 
development benefits the EU as well, and the transition from predominantly transatlantic 
world order back to more Eurasian centric and multipolar order might increase EU’s 
relative influence in global affairs. 
                                                 
20 MERICS, Europe’s position in the US-China trade conflict: It’s the exports, stupid, 25 May 2020, 
(Accessed 20 February 2021) 
https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/europes-position-us-china-trade-conflict-its-exports-stupid  
21 Rand Corporation (2018), China Belt and Road Initiative. Measuring the impact of improving 
transportation connectivity on trade in the region 
22 Compatible Interests? The EU and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Svante E. Cornell, Niklas 





This system of global free-market liberalism relies on the rule of law. National 
governments have limited their sovereignty over private enterprise by international 
treaties and national laws by which they are bound. While the world has always been 
filled with authoritarian regimes, their influence has not been taken into account when 
constructing the legal framework around FDI’s. The liberal democracies commanded 
most of the world’s GDP and poor authoritarian countries did not pose a threat to this 
system as they could not afford to do so. Russia, the successor of the Soviet superpower 
has an economy smaller than Italy.23 The trend of deregulation of international capital 
flows and FDI’s has continued unaffected until now, when China, a country ruled by the 
all-powerful Communist Party, has become the second-largest economy in the world and 
the global market leader in many industries ranging from manufacturing to various 
technology sectors. 
However, China has not adhered to the theory of inevitable democratisation as a result of 
economic prosperity.24 The main purpose of the Communist Party of China is to stay in 
control and to maintain its rule over the country and as China lacks effective rule of law, 
many lawmakers in the West have grown concerned over the influence the Communist 
Party could wield over the Chinese companies operating overseas and foreign enterprises 
with Chinese ownership.25 The fear is that through Chinese investments and ownership 
in Western countries, the Communist Party will gain the ability to interfere in the 
democratic processes of Western countries by using economic leverage. Simultaneously 
during the isolationist policies of the government of Donald Trump has undermined the 
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global economic system and presented China an opportunity to establish itself as the 
provider of stability and the withdrawal of the United States has given China a stronger 
hand in its bilateral trade deals with other countries and therefore has given China more 
and more leverage to influence the rules of global trade and economic rules. 
This kind of soft power in the hands of a non-liberal government is an unheard nightmare 
for most Western nations. This does not require any malicious intent from the Chinese. 
Simply the sheer economic interest China has within the EU puts China into European 
interest groups, Chinese investments are a lifeline for some member states while in others 
the Chinese investors are large employers and have such economic effect that the 
democratic process turns on itself and makes it politically dangerous to anger the 
Communist Party of China. The ultimate fear is some sort of Finlandization towards 
China. Besides the political influence the Kremlin held over Finland, the Finnish 
economy grew heavily dependent on the preferential trade, which turned into internal 
political pressure to align with the eastern neighbour. 
In addition to Foreign Direct Investment, Chinese financing for European projects gives 
China a stake in them by binding them in the terms and conditions of the financing 
agreement. An example of the ramifications of growing Chinese influence through 
financing and contracting is the acquisition of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka by the 
Chinese Government in 2015. China Harbour Engineering Company built a major port in 
Sri Lanka under a contract for the Sri Lankan government. This massive construction 
project was financed through generous financing from Chinese banks, even though Sri 
Lanka was already heavily indebted, and the ports profitability was questionable from the 




agreed to hand over the port and surrounding areas to China for 99 years.26 An analogy 
can be drawn to history with the strategy employed by the British and the Dutch whose 
empires relied on the control of maritime trade and which were secured by a network of 
harbours and military ports, Hong Kong and Singapore to name a few. 
The attitudes towards Chinese money in Europe are conflicting. On the other hand, 
Chinese investments are a blessing as they create jobs and have a positive effect on many 
stagnating economies in the EU and on the other hand they are feared as a curse and as 
the figurative Trojan Horse, which lets Chinese political influence creep into European 
decision making. As a large amount of Chinese foreign investments is funded through 
direct state aid or preferential state-backed financing, such as concessional loans, it has 
created suspicion within the EU about Chinese motivations. State aid is prohibited in the 
EU by European competition law, and some prominent European politicians have called 
to extend this prohibition to exterior parties and increased transparency on the funding of 
Chinese enterprises. At the same time, Chinese investments are welcomed by European 
economies and in the cases of Portugal and Greece, they have proved vital for their 
national economies. This has caused concern in the wider Union that sizeable Chinese 
owned assets in an EU Member State might give China unwanted influence over its 
government.27 Chinese investments are protected by European legislation and the 
bilateral investment treaties the EU countries have with China. The EU has long 
complained that European investors are not given equal treatment in Chinese markets and 
on some unfair practices that have been imposed on foreign investors for access to 
Chinese markets. Many of these issues have been addressed by the new Investment Law 
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in China, at least on paper. The featuring lack of rule of law in China makes it yet to be 
seen how it affects the real situation in the country. 
As China becomes more integrated into the global economy, its laws and policies will 
affect the European Union. The way technology or industry leader can extend their 
jurisdiction almost globally is well exemplified by the United States. The US authorities 
can enforce its policies globally by the threat of being shut out of the American markets 
or being prevented from doing business with US companies. As a response, there has 
been an increasing amount of arguments that the EU should take a more protectionist 
stance in its FDI policies to prevent critical reliance on foreign suppliers and technology 
to ensure healthy competition. However, the return to protectionist policies and economic 
isolationism run the risk of undoing much of the good that globalisation has brought, such 
as countries having an economic interest in the prosperity of others and more incentives 
to find mutually beneficial solutions to issues. 
4. European Regulatory Framework 
Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) established 
foreign direct investment as an EU competence as a part of the common commercial 
policy. The bilateral investment treaties in force prior to the implementation of the Lisbon 
Treaty would stay in force upon authorisation by the European Commission until a 
bilateral investment treaty between the EU and the non-EU country in question comes in 
force.28 The main change in EU-China investment relations is the upcoming 
                                                 





Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), which will replace the 26 existing 
bilateral investment treaties the EU Member States, including Finland, have with China.29  
However, the Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that national 
security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.30 This creates a conflict 
between the Union competence over commercial policy and Member State competence 
over national security as they are increasingly inseparable when it comes to regulating 
foreign investments. Regulating and screening FDI in the EU is therefore a burden shared 
by both the Union and its Member States. Mere fact that national security has been 
invoked cannot render EU law inapplicable.31 Furthermore, as WTO provisions are an 
integral part of EU law,32 Member States do not have reliable way to regulate FDI even 
on national security grounds as it still has to conform to WTO and EU law and as 
individual Member State may cause the whole EU to be in breach of WTO obligations, 
the responsibility over European FDI regulation and related security issues in reality falls 
mostly on the European Commission to navigate through and take a leading stance in 
common policy to ensure an unified approach. 
Foreign Direct Investments are a major part of EU trade policy. According to the 
European Commission: “Foreign direct investment stocks held in the rest of the world by 
investors resident in the EU amounted to EUR 8,750 billion at the end of 2018. 
Meanwhile, foreign direct investment stocks held by third-country investors in the EU 
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amounted to EUR 7,197 billion at the end of 2018.”33 Negotiating Investment treaties are, 
therefore, a two way street for the Union, as European investors have a large interest in 
accessibility and protection in foreign countries. Imposing restrictions might lead to a 
deteriorating situation for European investors, which makes negotiated treaties the 
preferred solutions to one-sided policy changes to assess the perceived fairness, 
transparency and equality of treatment for investments in foreign markets. 
4.1. Bilateral Investment Treaty Between China and Finland 
Finland has signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the People’s Republic of 
China in 2006.34 The BIT between Finland and China is a good example of how Chinese 
FDIs are currently regulated and necessary to be familiar with to understand the 
circumstances under which China has had access to European markets. Its focus clearly 
is more on attracting more investments and guaranteeing the investors rights rather than 
protecting against unwanted investment practices. 
At the time of the signing of the treaty, the Finnish government recognised improving its 
economic-industrial relations with the Chinese government as of utmost importance for 
Finnish business. At the time many major Finnish corporations such as Nokia and Kone 
relied heavily on growing Chinese markets and over 50 Finnish enterprises had invested 
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in industrial production in China. At the same time, Chinese investment in Finland was 
scarce, which the Finnish government hoped this treaty would change.35 
In the Treaty, both parties agree to promote and protect investments from the other 
country. In the Treaty both Finland and China pledge to provide just and reasonable 
treatment to investors from the other signatory country, to protect their rights and to 
safeguard their investments. The Treaty provides protection against arbitrary 
expropriation of foreign assets and other actions by a signatory of the Treaty that may 
undermine the ownership or economic interest of an investor from the other signatory 
country. Expropriation is only allowed under specific circumstances and only when the 
following terms are fulfilled according to Article 4 of the Treaty:36 
a) According to the public interest 
b) In due process under the national law 
c) Without discrimination 
d) Against reimbursement, which corresponds to the reasonable market value of the 
assets 
The Treaty also provides reimbursement for the Investors from the other Signatory 
Country, who suffer losses due to civil unrest or whose investments have been 
appropriated or damaged by actions from local authorities.  
Article 6 guarantees free transfer of assets, such as profits or maintenance fees, which are 
tied to the investments and fall under the Treaty.37 Investors must be allowed to move 
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said assets between the Signatory Countries freely and without obstacles. Articles 8 
covers the dispute resolution between the Signatory Countries. The disputes between the 
Signatory Countries will primarily be solved through diplomatic negotiations, and should 
they fail, through a three-man arbitration, in which both of the signatory countries appoint 
a single arbitrator who will in turn jointly appoint the third arbitrator as the chairman of 
the arbitration. The chairman must be a national of such a third-party country that has 
diplomatic relations with both Signatory Countries. In case the court of arbitration has 
not been formed within four months then either Signatory Country may request the 
Chairman of the International Court of Justice to make the appointments, and in case the 
Chairman is disqualified the authority falls to the next most senior qualified member of 
the International Court of Justice.38 
Article 9 covers dispute resolution between a Signatory Country and an Investor from the 
other Signatory Country. The article stipulates that any disputes should primarily be 
resolved in a conciliatory manner between the two parties in dispute, if possible. If a 
resolution is not reached in this manner within three months, then the Investor is given a 
choice of three further actions to resolve the dispute.39 
Firstly, the Investor may bring the dispute to be resolved by a competent court of the 
country in which the investment has been made. The Investor also has the possibility to 
cancel the court proceedings and bring the dispute to be resolved by either of the two 
following arbitrations as long as the court has not given its verdict on the dispute. 
Secondly, the Investor may bring the dispute to be resolved through arbitration by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), formed under the 
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ICSID Convention of 1966.40 Thirdly, the Investor may bring the dispute to be resolved 
by a temporary arbitration, formed under the arbitration rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), which will consist of three 
members who will resolve the issue under the national laws of the Signatory Country 
involved in the dispute. The norms of the international private law and international 
treaties in which both Signatory Countries are a party also apply. The parties of the 
dispute may also agree on some other means to resolve the dispute and the verdict given 
by an arbitration formed in accordance with this article of the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
is binding on the parties of the dispute and will be carried out in accordance to the national 
laws. 
In short, the Treaty gives protection to the Chinese investors in Finland and makes it 
harder to impose restrictions targeted at China. Moreover, it protects access to Finland 
for the Chinese investors, who are to be treated no worse than investors from third 
countries and grants legal protection for the investor’s assets. The dispute resolution 
clause gives protection to the investors over arbitrary policy changes of national 
governments. Possible restricting measures for Chinese companies operating in Finland, 
such as banning Huawei from 5G markets, may be in breach of this Treaty. The Bilateral 
Investment Treaty does not specify national interest or security reasons as exceptions for 
the investment protection therein agreed upon.  
                                                 






The Treaty is to be superseded by the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment which is 
currently under negotiations by the EU and China, for which Finland, among the other 
EU Member States, have given a mandate to the European Commission.41 
4.2. Comprehensive Agreement on Investment 
The CAI recognises China and the EU as important and strategic markets for each other 
and aims to create equal grounds for bilateral investments. Through the agreement, the 
EU seeks to open up Chinese markets for European investors further from what China’s 
commitments under the World Trade Organisation provide. The European Parliament 
describes the objectives of the agreement as: “The CAI is intended to go far beyond 
traditional investment protection to also cover market access, investment-related 
sustainable development, and level playing field issues, such as transparency of subsidies, 
and rules on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and forced technology transfer”42 This is 
done by increasing transparency within China, ensuring fair competition for European 
companies and eliminating discriminatory practices and restrictions on foreign ownership 
in China. The European Commission states on its website the primary objectives for the 
Agreement being: “Transparency, predictability and legal certainty of the investment 
environment are equally important. The agreement should ensure that European 
companies in China have proper access to information affecting their businesses and the 
opportunity to comment on relevant laws and regulations. It is also important to ensure 
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clear, transparent and objective licensing and authorisation procedures and 
requirements, as well as to guarantee procedural fairness and due process.”43 
The EU sees the European markets to be more open for Chinese companies than the 
Chinese markets are for Europeans and aims to address this lack of balance by reaching 
an agreement with the Chinese government. The negotiations have been going on since 
2014 and both sides have reached a conclusion that the agreement will go beyond a 
traditional investment protection agreement to cover market access for investment and 
several other important issues, including clear rules on dispute resolution. The EU seeks 
to achieve higher levels of legal protection for European companies operating within 
China by reflecting the EU’s reformed approach to investor-to-state dispute settlement 
through, Investment Court System, while still maintaining the state’s right to regulate.44 
Also, access to China’s public procurement markets is highly important for European 
investors, but as it is being negotiated under the WTO framework it is not included within 
the scope of the CAI. However, the developments in the negotiations on China’s inclusion 
in the GPA are closely connected to the outcome of the CAI negotiations. 
The negotiations, which had been stalling for years reached a milestone in December 
2020 as the EU agreed to the agreement “in principle” after China reportedly made 
significant concessions on several key issues.45 Several commentators saw the 
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geopolitical implications of China’s eagerness to reach an agreement before Joe Biden is 
sworn into office in the United States and the anticipated transatlantic rapprochement 
further complicates EU’s relations with China. The EU seems to have also conceded in 
some of its original demands to reach an agreement, such as dropping the demand for the 
binding investor court system for settling investment disputes, which would have had 
jurisdiction over the Chinese government and settled on a looser arbitration clause.46  
The concluded agreement heralds an end to joint venture requirements, caps on foreign 
equity, the FTTs, increases transparency regarding subsidies, China will provide equal 
access to standard-setting bodies for European companies and importantly, China agreed 
to enforcement and monitoring mechanisms that EU has insisted upon. CAI also brings 
the SOEs under mutually agreed scrutiny and allows the EU to request information 
necessary to assess the behaviour of the SOEs as well as opens up many previously closed 
industries for European Companies and levels the unfair competition experienced earlier 
by European firms.47 The conclusion of the CAI will significantly affect the future of 
Chinese FDI in Europe as the EU has now committed itself to this agreement which 
reciprocally guarantees Chinese access to the EU markets. 
4.3. Finnish Regulation Regarding Foreign Investment 
The EU is a free-market area where private ownership and investments are relatively 
lightly regulated. Foreign investors are given equal protection, and any restrictions must 
be based on positive law. Foreign direct investments (FDI) are generally welcomed for 
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their economy-boosting effects and foreign investments are more often promoted rather 
than restricted. In Finland, mainly national security aspects may restrict foreign parties 
from acquiring ownership in certain assets. The most obvious restrictions for foreign 
investment are indeed restrictions on foreign ownership.  
The main piece of legislation in Finland to regulate foreign investments is the Act on the 
Screening of Foreign Corporate Acquisitions (172/2012).48 The Act sets out the grounds 
on which foreign acquisitions may be restricted or blocked and how they are monitored 
by the Finnish authorities. The Act is currently being updated to conform to the 
requirements of new EU regulation.49 The Act defines the screened object as a defence 
industrial corporation or other forms of business that is deemed to be critical for the vital 
functions of the society. Article 3 sets the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
as the supervising authority. The Ministry is responsible for handling and authorising 
foreign corporate acquisitions in case they fall under the restricted category. 
Article 4 covers acquisitions of defence industrial corporations, for which a preliminary 
approval must be acquired from the Ministry. The Ministry must approve the acquisition 
unless it could cause a severe threat to national security interests. The foreign owner is 
responsible for delivering all necessary documentation to the Ministry for evaluation. 
Article 5 covers other than defence, or dual-purpose, industry acquisitions for which the 
foreign owner can at their own initiative seek authorisation from the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment in order to gain legal protection for carrying on the 
acquisition. The Ministry may also require the foreign owner to provide all necessary 
information and documents regarding the acquisition to the Ministry for evaluation and 
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subsequent approval. The Ministry is required to issue the formal request within three 
months from the moment the Ministry gained knowledge of the acquisition. The Ministry 
has to approve the acquisition unless the foreign acquisition might pose a security threat 
to a vital national interest.  
Article 7 states that the Finnish Government may deny approval from a foreign 
acquisition only if it is necessary to protect a vital national interest. Article 8 regulates the 
consequences of denying approval for foreign acquisition. If the approval of acquisition 
regarding a limited liability company is denied, the foreign owner must relinquish a 
number of shares so that the number of votes they command no longer exceed 10 per cent 
of the total votes or some other percentile of votes approved by the Ministry by an earlier 
decree. After the authorisation has been denied, the foreign owner may only use the 
number of shares that will constitute the previously mentioned number of votes in 
corporate assemblies. In acquisitions of other than limited liability companies, the 
denying of the approval voids all contracts constituting the transfer of factual ownership 
of the business. 
The amendments to the Act came into effect on 11 October 2020. The government 
proposal 103/202050 proposed to amend the Act on the Screening of Foreign Corporate 
Acquisition to include the new provisions of the EU Regulation 2019/452. In addition, 
several other changes are proposed for national reasons. The current Act is noticeably 
created for another time, as its main focus is protecting the defence industry from foreign 
interference and ambiguous “vital national interests”. Then again, this ambiguity offers 
certain flexibility in the application of the law that may come useful if the governments 
find itself in a situation where it wants to use the legislation to curtail growing Chinese 
influence in Finland, but this kind of seemingly arbitrary use of the law by the screening 
                                                 




authorities affects the predictability of investing in Finland and might increase its 
perceived discriminatory nature.  
5. World Trade Organisation 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) is an intergovernmental organisation that regulates 
international trade between nations. WTO superseded and replaced the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1995 after the Marrakesh Declaration signed by 123 
countries. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was the key agreement regulating 
the global economy. The first version was signed by 23 countries in 1947 and it has been 
succeeded by several upgraded versions latest of which came into effect in 1994 and saw 
the formation of the World Trade Organisation.51 GATT was created in the aftermath of 
the second world war, partially influenced by the belief that more integrated economies 
are less likely to wage war against each other or engage in hostile competition, an idea 
which also influenced the formation European Coal and Steel Community, the starting 
point of European integration and predecessor to the European Union. 
China joined the WTO as the 143rd member state on 11 December 2001 after extensive 
negotiations and completing several liberalising reforms on its economy, such as 
separating the military from economic activities.52 The WTO is currently under 
renegotiations that also began in 2001. WTO’s primary goal is to set out global trading 
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rules and to remove excess barriers on trade and remove unnecessary tariffs. WTO also 
adversely regulates the instances where tariffs or said trade barriers can be implemented. 
Global trade has changed tremendously from the signing of the first version of GATT in 
1947 as the global economy has consequently become deeply integrated. The unified rule 
system governing international trade and free markets led to the rise of multinational 
corporations, which realised that investing in their target markets and establishing a 
presence there is much more economically viable than exporting overseas from a single 
country. Production chains have become very decentralised and the design process and 
the production of parts for consumer goods may be happening in several different 
countries whereas at the time when the first GATT was signed, usually the whole 
production chain, barring perhaps raw materials, took place in a single country and under 
its jurisdiction. 53 Foreign investment has existed before GATT, but the post-world war 
two world has seen an unprecedented increase in FDI. The treaty system gives legal 
protection for foreign-owned property against arbitrary expropriations by national 
governments and has made investing in foreign countries a safer and more viable 
enterprise in numerous other ways. 
In the 1990s after the end of the Cold War liberal democracy and the market economy 
had triumphed over authoritarianism and command economy. There was a wave of 
optimism in the West that economic growth and economic freedom would eventually 
result in universal adoption of liberal Western values and global democratisation. There 
was even a talk about the “end of history” as coined by Francis Fukuyama in his famous 
book “The End of History and the Last Man” from 1992 in which he argues that the 
                                                 






Western liberal democracy and free-market economy are the ”the end-point of mankind's 
ideological evolution” and predicts the “universalization of Western liberal democracy 
as the final form of human government.”54 This outlook was shared by many in the West 
and was met with a wave of privatisation and deregulation spearheaded by the ever-
growing financial industry eager to capitalise on this new era of economic freedom. 
China’s liberal economic reforms were seen as a part of this trend and the democratic 
liberalisation of China was seen as an inevitable outcome as its population becomes more 
prosperous and middle-classed. American investment banks advised in the reorganisation 
and privatisation of the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises.55  
The West based much of their foreign policy towards China on this proposition and many 
were eager to include China into their international organisations such as the WTO as it 
was thought to speed up the process of liberalisation in China. In the negotiations 
preceding the membership, China was granted many concessions that many Western 
politicians would arguably have thought about differently had they been given the power 
of hindsight at the time. The democratisation of China has seen so inevitable outcome of 
it accepting the free trade and liberal economic principles of the WTO that few people 
spared thoughts on what a resurgent China, an economic powerhouse under the firm grip 
of the CCP would look like.  
WTO currently regulates state subsidies in international trade and divides them into 
prohibited subsidies and actionable subsidies.56 They generally target unfair trade 
practices, where another country subsidises its exports to undermine the domestic 
production and competition in other countries. China’s state subsidies in foreign direct 
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investments have prompted the EU, US and Japan to seek changes to WTO rules in this 
regard to cover FDI’s as well. A closely related multilateral agreement within the WTO 
framework is the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) which aims to ensure 
transparency and fairer international competition in public procurements. China is 
currently undergoing negotiations with the other signatories to join GPA, which would 
open huge public procurement markets to foreign investors and would remove another 
qualm in investment relations with China.57 
The European Union issued a proposal to the WTO on Investment Facilitation in February 
2020.58 In the proposal, the EU seeks to increase transparency and predictability of 
investment measures and to streamline administrative procedures and requirements in 
investment activities between WTO members. All of these issues are also a main concern 
for the European Union in its negotiations for the Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
with China. The WTO agreements provide the legal framework for international trade 
which is essential for keeping the global economy in motion as they provide security and 
confidence for businesses engaging in global trade against arbitrary policy changes and 
guards them against the whims of national governments. In short, WTO aims to make the 
global rules of commerce as transparent and predictable as they can be.59 
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6. Foreign Direct Investment 
6.1. Overview 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined by Statistics Finland (Tilastokeskus) as “A 
direct investment relationship exists between a resident enterprise in one economy (direct 
investor) and an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy 
other than that of the direct investor when the direct investor has control (over 50% of 
the voting power) or influence (from 10% to 50%) over the direct investment 
enterprise.”60 This means that a foreign direct investment usually occurs when an entity 
from another country acquires substantial influence on an enterprise in another country, 
founds a new enterprise in another country or when it expands operations in a subsidiary 
it already controls in another country. FDI is distinct from foreign portfolio investment 
as the assumes a substantial level of control over the business instead of just passively 
owning equity in the company.61 
Foreign Direct Investments are highly coveted as they bring in foreign capital, increase 
employment and have other economy-boosting effects and thereby many, especially 
developed economies with slowing economic growth and increasing indebtedness have 
sought to remove restrictions on FDIs to invigorate their national economies. Many 
countries compete with each other to acquire foreign investments by deregulating their 
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markets and implementing lenient taxation policies or other economic incentives to attract 
foreign enterprises into investing in their countries. For example, one of the 
responsibilities of the Finnish Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment and 
Business Finland is to promote foreign investments in Finland.62 On the other hand, free 
capital movements have raised concerns about the loss of national sovereignty and other 
possible adverse consequences, as multinational corporations have become too powerful 
for regulatory authorities in smaller economies to have power over.  
The European Commission published economic data on foreign investment in the EU and 
its impact in 2019 Commission Staff working document on FDI in the EU. According to 
the data, in 2016, 3% of European companies were owned or controlled by non-EU 
investors representing 35% of total assets and around 16 million jobs in the Single Market 
area.63 The document divides the main sources of FDI into “traditional” main investors 
and new investors. Main investors consist of the old advanced economies or “first world 
countries” such as the US, Japan, Switzerland etc. and they control some 80% of all of 
the foreign-controlled assets in the EU. New investors consist of the other countries, that 
have begun investing in the EU in recent decades, of which China stands out as the largest 
and most rapidly growing its share in total FDI. Several industries in the EU have 
remarkably high levels of foreign ownership and there has been a substantial increase in 
foreign state ownership of European companies. The EU has grown worried about 
compromised national security due to foreign government gaining substantial influence 
in the Union or one of its Member States if its nationals or SOEs become dominant in 
some key industries. Special scrutiny is placed over new and developing industries in 
which a pioneering innovator may quickly achieve a dominant position. The EU is also 
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hard-pressed for responding to government-subsidised foreign competition 
outperforming European companies.  
All the main “traditional” investors are OECD member countries, as still in 2012 OECD 
countries accounted for 77% of global FDI outflows.64 Consequently, the FDI regulation 
has naturally been developing in an environment where the vast majority of cross-border 
investments occur between countries with relatively similar economic and political 
systems and a high level of existing co-operation and mutual interests. The OECD´s 
background influence over the regulatory framework and attitudes regarding FDI should 
be noted to understand how China presents a fundamental shift in this environment.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an 
intergovernmental organisation that focuses on establishing international standards for 
improving economic performance and a wide range of other aspects focusing on 
improving international co-operation and policies.65 The OECD is somewhat of a more 
exclusive version of the WTO as its members mainly consist of advanced Western 
economies and as a consequence, its work is much more focused on advancing the shared 
interests of the said countries. Due to its members commanding most of the world GDP66 
its policies have a global effect and even though China is not a member, the organisation 
studies and publishes data in Chinese economic integration into the global free-market 
system. The OECD acts as a forum for its members to discuss common policy, to seek 
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answers for common issues and the organisation publishes statistics and other economic 
studies and coordinates its members' efforts to stimulate economic progress.  
The OECD maintains a Foreign Direct Investment Regulatory Restriction Index in which 
it evaluates the restrictiveness of a country’s FDI rules by focusing on four main 
parameters, which are:67 
- Foreign equity limitations 
- Screening or approval mechanisms 
- Restrictions on the employment of foreigners as key personnel 
- Operational restrictions, e.g. restrictions on branching and on capital repatriation or 
on land ownership 
Finland has a score of 0.019 and implements limited foreign equity limitations and 
screening mechanisms for foreign acquisitions under the Act on the Screening of Foreign 
Corporate Acquisitions (172/2012). China scores much higher in the index at 0.281 as it 
has traditionally wielded many forms of FDI restrictions, notably forced technology 
transfers and joint venture requirements with local Chinese enterprises, even though 
China has gradually been removing many of these restrictions.68 These OECD statistics 
help conceptualise the “uneven” playing field the EU has long been concerned over in its 
relations with China. 
                                                 
67 FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(accessed on 8 September 2020) 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/fdiindex.htm 






Reasons for maintaining and implementing FDI restrictions alongside national security 
concerns include economic protectionism by keeping key sectors of the economy under 
national control and wishing to maintain the survivability of certain domestic industries 
from global competition.69 A key strategy, especially for technology giants, has been to 
nip their competition in the bud by buying out promising start-ups and smaller 
competitors. Globalisation and international markets have led to a situation where the 
economics of the scale favour the existing companies and some countries aspiring to 
nurture their prospecting companies in the industry seek to protect them from foreign 
acquisitions.   
                                                 





6.2. Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the EU 
Chinese FDI into the European Union has been increasing the past decade and especially 
since 2010, and although the overall levels of FDI have been decreasing the past few 
years, the figure still remains considerable, as show in the following graph:70  
 
Whereas the EU generally welcomes inward FDI, the large volume of FDI’s coming from 
China and its concentration on critical infrastructure has raised concerns of foreign 
influence within the Union and calls for reforms to tackle security concerns whilst 
keeping the European markets open.71 For decades, China has been one of the largest 
recipients of FDI and contributed little outward FDI until quite recently. As China opened 
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up, its vast markets and cheap labour attracted foreign companies to cut their production 
costs by moving their production to China. At the time, many European companies were 
in a hurry to capitalise on these reforms and subsequently, investment treaties generally 
were more focused on protecting and promoting western investment in China. This also 
gave the Chinese negotiators a somewhat better position, where they could issue 
limitations, such as joint venture requirements, equity caps and quantitative restrictions, 
on foreign investors. Now that many Chinese tech companies are seemingly taking over 
their western competitors, one of the biggest issues has been the common requirement of 
technology sharing as a price of doing business in China.72 Besides periodic complaints, 
the western companies and the EU accepted this as a price of doing business in China, 
but as China has developed this attitude has changed and the EU has begun to demand 
equal access and equal treatment more firmly. 
As Chinese investors have been acquiring a lot of European companies and invested in 
infrastructure in recent years, in some places turning Chinese investors into major 
employers and stakeholders within the EU. European lawmakers have increasingly raised 
concern about the growing Chinese influence in the EU especially after Chinese investors 
acquired majority ownership in several large European harbours and began buying into 
some vital industries of several major EU countries. Chinese technology companies, 
previously accused of copyright violations, have bought out their western competitors 
and their R&D, a homegrown example being the Finnish company Supercell, in which 
Tencent acquired an 84% stake in 2016.73 
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The European Union is currently reforming itself in order to bring FDI’s under its clear 
jurisdiction and control on the single-market area. The Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment is one of the key elements of this reform in regard to China. One issue that 
the EU has with China is the unevenness of the playing field, where Chinese investors 
have relatively more open access to European markets than the European investors, who 
are barred from owning or ownership heavily limited in many industries in China. 
One of the main features the EU is pursuing in the negotiations for the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment is to make Chinese markets as open to European investors as 
the European markets are to the Chinese.74 Calls have been made within the Union to 
increase restrictions on Chinese ownership if the Chinese are reluctant to grant correlative 
access to the Europeans. The key piece of regulation regarding Chinese investments in 
the European Union will be the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment once its 
negotiations will be finished. 
The Chinese SOEs have been the largest outward investors in China contributing more 
than 70% of total Chinese FDI in the EU.75 One of the best-known examples of the 
Growth of Chinese influence in Europe through investments has been the previously 
mentioned acquisition of a majority stake in the Piraeus Harbour and the subsequent plans 
to enlarge it. This has had a significant impact on Greece’s troubled economy and made 
COSCO a major economic actor in Greece. It has been speculated that Greek economic 
dependence on Chinese investments might make Greek policymakers inclined to protect 
the interests of the Chinese government both domestically and in its foreign policy, thus 
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potentially granting the Chinese government leverage on EU decision making.76 Chinese 
State-Owned Enterprises were especially active in European acquisitions during 2015-
2017 when their acquisitions totalled over 48 billion euros in value.77 
The main purpose of Chinese FDI into the EU is to promote Chinese businesses operating 
within the Union and to increase Chinese exports into the EU. Other reasons include 
buying out competitors, acquiring research and development work of European tech firms 
and generally expanding their portfolios. The largest investments have been made 
towards infrastructure projects and acquisitions as China seeks to increase its trade 
connections throughout Europe, Asia and Africa. Chinese State-Owned Enterprises have 
also shown an apt sense of opportunities as they have taken advantage of economic 
disturbances such as the financial crisis of 2008 and the Euro crisis of 2012 by acquiring 
strategic assets on discount.78 The EU has grown wary and has taken steps to protect 
European assets from these kinds of foreign actions.  
The peak year of Chinese FDI in the EU was 2016 and it has been decreased since. Also, 
the share of the Chinese State-Owned Enterprises in total FDI into the EU has declined 
over the past three years remarkably while private Chinese companies have increased 
their role in European investments. Chinese SOEs 79 Measured by cumulative value, most 
of the Chinese FDI in EU during this century has been directed at the developed western 
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European countries, especially the UK,80 and also notably Finland, which has received 
almost as much Chinese FDI as France or Italy, thanks to several high-value acquisitions 
such as that of Supercell Oy and Amer sports Oyj.81  
6.3. The Belt and Road Initiative 
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the most ambitious infrastructure development 
project of this century. It includes investments in more than 70 economies across Eurasia 
in an effort to revolutionise the economic landscape of “the old world”. It is the most 
recent, and the current flagship project of China´s internationalisation,82 which it has used 
as a framework to create new international institutions and organisations that may come 
to rival some of the exiting ones.  
The BRI includes a third of global trade and GDP and more than 60% of the world’s 
population.83 The BRI has immense implications on the future of the global economy, 
geopolitics and balance of power. It marks the decline of the global hegemony of the US 
and a shift from the contemporary transatlantic world order to a more multipolar order, 
increasing China’s influence in global affairs. The BRI is organised through numerous 
institutions such as political steering agencies, multilateral cooperation mechanisms, 
funding institutions, platforms, think tanks and relevant state-owned enterprises. The 
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main agency overseeing the initiative is the National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) of the State Council and it operates in close coordination with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce and the Development Research 
Centre od the State Council.84 The NDRC is the highest economic management agency 
in China, with broad authority over the economy. 
China seeks to invest in both overland infrastructure and connections between Europe 
and Asia, which is the “Road” part of the plan and in maritime infrastructure in South-
Eastern Asia and in the coastal economies of the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, 
which is the “Belt” part. The objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative was summarised 
by Chinese president Xi Jinping in 2017 as follows: “China will actively promote 
international co-operation through the Belt and Road Initiative. In doing so, we hope to 
achieve policy, infrastructure, trade, financial, and people-to-people connectivity and 
thus build a new platform for international co-operation to create new drivers of shared 
development”85  
While the BRI focuses mostly on economic development, the OECD breaks its 
motivations down to promoting connectivity, openness, innovation, sustainable 
development motivations, energy and food security, more balanced regional development 
and improving overall economic efficiency.86 The connectivity is arguably the most 
important of these in regards to the EU, as it is the main trading partner of China alongside 
the US. The BRI also carries substantial geopolitical implications as it ties the 
participating countries economically more closely to China. The BRI is divided into six 
economic corridors, three of which directly connect to Europe, and their main focus is to 
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increase rail and harbour connectivity. Large Chinese investments in major European 
ports and other infrastructure projects are a part of this plan. These projects will have a 
major economic impact on the countries they are located in and will have a profound 
effect on the European Union as they pose a major shift in the geostrategic connectivity 
and balance towards more southern and eastern parts of the Union.87 
Chinese acquisitions in the European harbour infrastructure are probably the most well-
publicised BRI related projects in Europe. More importantly, the 17+1 has been at the 
centrepiece of China’s future infrastructure investment strategy in Europe. The 17+1 
refers to an initiative by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to promote relations and 
increase investments between China and 17 Central and Eastern European countries.88 
Critics have raised concern that the 17+1 and growing Chinese influence is harming the 
European integration and threatens to internally divide the EU as many of the Eastern EU 
members that are part of the format are still in the process of integration and are 
economically generally less developed than majority of the older members. The format 
also includes several non-EU countries in the Balkans.  
The European Commission has been critical of this type of bilateral co-operation with 
China and in 2016 issued a joint communication to the European Parliament where it 
voiced its concern about the format as follows: “When Member States conduct their 
bilateral relations with China – whether one-on-one or as groups of countries such as the 
16+1 format – they should cooperate with the Commission, the EEAS and the other 
Member States to help ensure that aspects relevant to the EU are in line with EU law, 
rules and policies and that the overall outcome is beneficial for the EU as a whole.”89 
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Other than investing in corporate acquisitions and funding their expansion and 
development, a typical BRI infrastructure development project is often organised through 
a contractual arrangement that involves funding in a form of a concessional loan from a 
Chinese state-owned bank to the recipient government and awarded the execution of the 
development project to a Chinese SOE, which generally uses Chinese labour and materiel 
and often include tax exemptions for the contracting company.90 This type of arrangement 
might offer lesser impact on employment and direct economic impact on the recipient 
country, and especially in the case of smaller economies the large debt financing may 
result in substantial increase in national debt and affect financial sustainability. Also, 
there are increased concerns for transparency as the whole operation is executed by 
Chinese state-owned actors. Sustainable European participation in the BRI requires the 
realisation of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement to ensure the transparency and 
compliance with international standards. On the other hand, according to data published 
by the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC, Chinese enterprises abroad paid USD 56 billion 
in taxes and employed over 2 million foreign employees in 2019, which corresponds to 
roughly 60% of total employees in Chinese companies outside of China.91 While the 
proportion of local employees remain relatively low in comparison to typical Western 
OFDI statistics, the positive economic impact is considerable for the recipient countries, 
as infrastructure development stimulates the local economy. 
BRI projects are not however tied to any specific investment and project development 
arrangements are made individually for each project. Countries with more strategic 
importance in the scope of the BRI and stronger economies have better leverage on the 
negotiations and better ability to look after their overall interest, which makes it important 
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to have a clear Union-wide framework and common agenda for Member States engaging 
in the BRI.  
6.4. Huawei and 5G 
5G is a term for the next stage of development of mobile networks based on wireless 
high-frequency radio waves that are said to fully enable the Internet of Things and 
automatisation on a grand scale.92 5G is expected to be “the next big thing” in 
telecommunications, and once implemented, to have similar revolutionary effects on 
society as smartphones and the internet had. The largest provider and developer of 5G 
solutions and infrastructure is the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei and the 
geopolitical implications of China becoming the future technology leader has led to the 
US and several other western countries taking a hard stance on Huawei by restricting its 
access to their markets and lobbying other western countries to follow suit. The European 
Union has long had unresolved issues on Chinese practices towards incoming FDI. 5G is 
a good example of how international politics and old fashioned strategic security 
considerations play a large role93 in the global regulatory network regarding trade and 
investment, even if the world has been seemingly moving towards a more open and 
globalised free-market environment, where politics is more detached from the privatised 
economy. 
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A common practice, especially in the past was to force western companies to form joint 
ventures and to share technology with Chinese corporations in order to gain access to 
Chinese markets and labour pool.94 While this was previously accepted as the price of 
doing business in China, many Chinese companies are now overtaking their western 
competitors has increased pressure to call out these practices and seek some more 
satisfying resolution for the Western companies. Restricting Chinses technology and 
telecommunications companies access to western markets can partly be seen as a 
negotiation tool or a method to apply pressure on the Chinese government to concede to 
better treatment for European companies in China, which is one of the main objectives of 
the EU in its foreign relations with China.95 
The official concern for the US and its allies in Europe is that if the 5G infrastructure is 
built by Huawei, it might allegedly enable Chinese state espionage through technical 
backdoors and other built-in surveillance capabilities,96 an accusation that the company 
has denied. Furthermore, the more likely reason is that the US does not want to become 
path dependent on a system architecture under the control of its main geopolitical rival in 
such a vital field of technology. It is also a question of international competition law, 
Huawei is already the world’s largest producer of mobile network solutions and as the 
example of US technology giants such as Google or Microsoft shows that technology 
companies that seize the initial markets for new technology have a natural tendency to 
snuff out their subsequent competition by their sheer size an through “buy and kill” 
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tactics.97 The dominance of Huawei in mobile networks is a concern for the Western 
countries as they would become reliant on Chinese technology in a critical sector of the 
society, and that could give China immense ability to influence the direction to which the 
industry moves, forcing other countries to follow suit, giving China an effective political 
monopoly over the industry, much like the US has been able to do due to it presiding over 
the tech giants from  Silicon Valley. 
Huawei is an entirely Chinese owned company with its headquarters in Shenzhen, China, 
with the Finnish Nokia and Swedish Ericsson being its main competitors on the 5G 
development. The United States sees Huawei’s market share on emerging 5G markets as 
a threat to its national security and similar concerns have been raised amongst the US 
allies within the European Union. Huawei serves as a prime example of the geopolitical 
implications of the US being afraid that the Chinese will start dominating in global 
technology markets.98 Noteworthy here is that the US’ position as the world’s technology 
leader has given it the ability to issue industry standards and regulate the markets. 
Huawei’s rise is threatening to give an edge to the Chinese. The US has already banned 
Huawei from building 5G networks within the United States based on national security 
concerns and espionage accusations.99 Many European countries are currently 
considering similar actions against Huawei.  
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On 14 July 2020, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced a ban on Huawei 5G 
networks in the United Kingdom and will remove all Huawei hardware from its 5G 
infrastructure by 2027.100 Although the United Kingdom is no longer an EU member state, 
its decision increases the pressure on the EU member states to show unity and adhere to 
the hard-line policies of the US and the UK in regards to Huawei and undoubtedly towards 
other Chinese companies in the future. Several EU member-states have also implemented 
or contemplate limitations on Huawei hardware in their 5G infrastructures. The European 
Commission has sought to form a Union-wide policy towards 5G. In contrast to the 
British approach, which includes removing Huawei infrastructure and infringed on 
Huawei’s investment protection, the French ban focuses more narrowly on certain sectors 
of the infrastructure network deemed to be of vital national security interest, this is more 
in line with the existing treaty regulations with China and is a more reserved approach to 
curtailing increasing Chinese influence.101 
While the restrictions imposed on Huawei primarily focus on their 5G infrastructure 
implementation, they are not strictly focused on imposing restrictions on FDI’s in the 
telecommunications sector but they severely affect Huawei’s current assets within the 
EU, such as local Huawei subsidiaries and potential future investments in their operations 
on the European market. Denying access to the markets makes expansion in said 
jurisdiction rather undesirable. The sanctions on Huawei displays the fears Western 
countries have about China becoming a technology leader in such a critical industry. 
Although suspicion about potential espionage, a far more consequential would be the 
Chinese power to extend its jurisdiction over everyone who relies on Huawei’s products 
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or technology by the way of sanctions in a very similar fashion to how the US is currently 
trying to curb Huawei. 
In January 2020, the European Commission endorsed the joint toolbox of risk-mitigating 
measures agreed by the Member States of the European Union to address security risks 
related to the rollout of 5G mobile networks.102 The Toolbox is a response to 5G network 
security concerns in the European Union, in particular regard to suspected ties between 
Huawei and the Chinese government, although not explicitly mentioned. The Toolbox 
includes FDI screening framework to protect the European 5G supply chain and some of 
the strategic measured have raised legal concerns regarding their implementation and 
possible contradictions to key EU principles and international law and states: 
“Specifically, a ban that is de facto based on the supplier’s country of origin would violate 
the Most-Favoured Nation principle and National Treatment principle (Article III:4 of 
the GATT), which are key principles under World Trade Organization (“WTO”) law 
(Article I:1 and Article III:4 of the GATT) and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(“BITs”).”103  
The legal evaluation of the actual security risks posed by Huawei’s 5G infrastructure is 
crucial as adhering to the rule of law, the ban must be legally justifiable As the existing 
legislation and the BITs protect Huawei’s right to invest and to have legal protection for 
their investments, the limitations imposed must be based on verifiable security risks. 
Also, the scope of the limitations comes into question, whether it is sufficient to issue 
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limitations to the segments of the infrastructure that could compromise national security 
or is a nation-wide blanket ban legally justifiable. 
7. The Party, State and Government Entities 
The Chinese state is very bureaucratic and consists of a huge number of various agencies 
in multiple levels of hierarchy, tasked with overseeing and regulating their appropriated 
domains. The CCP is officially a separate entity from the state but is deeply integrated 
with all government agencies, State-Owned Enterprises and larger private enterprises.104 
The CCP maintains political control over the state to such an extent that the lines between 
the Party and the state often gets blurred. The State Council of the PRC is the central 
government of China, headed by the premier, Li Keqiang. The State Council consists of 
26 departments, which include all the ministries, a few commissions, the National Audit 
Office and the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank.105 
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7.1. State-Owned Enterprises and National Champions 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises or SOEs are a dominating feature in the Chinese 
economy. To an extent that China has been said to practice state-capitalism. SOEs have 
played a critical role in China´s globalisation and have been major overseas investors in 
the past two decades.106  
The two great reformers of the Chinese economy Zhu Rongji and Jiang Zemin adopted 
the policy of “grasping the large and letting the small go” 107 regarding the country’s vast 
and unproductive state industries. China dismantled its old socialist command economy 
by market reforms and privatisation of many large, uncompetitive SOEs while still 
maintaining control over those sectors deemed necessary for the CCP to maintain control 
over the Chinese economy. The SOEs operate on multiple levels in China’s economy and 
are roughly divided into central, nationwide massive SOEs, and smaller, provincial local 
SOEs. 108 
Those SOEs that remained in state-ownership were reorganised and reformed into 
competitive entities along lines of international accounting, legal and financial 
requirements with the help of western legal and financial advisors and Investment banks 
in the 1990’s.109 In addition to the business administration reorganisation, these reforms 
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included partial privatisations and listings in both domestic and foreign stock exchanges, 
all the while the CCP retained a varying level of control over them through various 
methods ranging from full ownership to minority shareholder status with voting majority. 
The SOEs have since grown into dominant actors in many sectors of the global economy 
with 91 out of 124 total Chinese companies listed in the fortune 500 being under state 
ownership.110 Many of them can credit their status for being legal or effective monopolies 
in the second-largest economy in the world. The SOEs have also played a dominant role 
in Chinese outbound FDI (OFDI), and by the end of 2019, China’s total OFDI stock 
amounted to USD2.2 trillion, third-largest after the United States and the Netherlands, 
40% of which is held by local SOEs.111 
Most of the SOEs are administered by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the ruling State Council, or SASAC, which is a 
ministerial-level government institution under the direction of the State Council and 
Central Committee of the CCP.112 The SOEs have a common business structure and their 
administration is mostly tasked with ordinary business administration as in making a 
profit for the shareholders and conducting a sensible business on somewhat market terms. 
SASAC appoints the members of the board and the top brass and supervises that the 
governmental interests are taken into account in the conduct of the business. 
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The Chinese banking sector is also largely state-controlled. China’s largest banks and the 
main financiers of Chinese companies, the big four, are all state-owned or at least 
controlled by the central government.113 The Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, China Construction Bank and the Bank of 
Communications constitute a major share of China’s total credit intermediation. These 
state-owned banks do not operate strictly on market terms but act as an inexpensive source 
of credit for government-sanctioned projects and businesses. The banks are managed by 
the sovereign wealth fund of China, China Investment Corporation, which reports directly 
to the State Council and the Ministry of Finance. China only recently in 2020 opened its 
securities markets for foreign competition,114 but as the massive banks have already 
cemented their position in the Chinese lending markets, it is unlikely to change the 
situation drastically. 
The SOEs and the state-owned banks have a critical role115 in the ambitious Belt and Road 
Initiative by which China seeks to reorganise global trade by recreating the old silk road 
by investing in massive infrastructure development projects across Eurasia.116 The SOEs 
are heavily involved in these projects and many of the large acquisitions made in the EU 
past decade have been part of this initiative. A good example is the acquisition of the 
Greek port of Piraeus by the Chinese State-owned shipping and harbour giant Chinese 
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Ocean Shipping Company, or COSCO in 2016. The Chinese government plans to turn 
the harbour into the main destination of Chinese produced goods destined to the European 
markets and has announced large investments in the harbour facilities and infrastructure 
in the Balkans.117 
Despite the large state-control over the economy, China’s economy is very regionalised 
with the state sector dominant in most of the provinces. This is in sharp contrast to the 
rich coastal provinces, namely Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Guangdong, which house the 
majority of China’s private financial and technological industries. The Chinese state-
controlled sector is often called an economy within an economy, nurtured in a cocoon 
safe from threatening competition,118 and while its share of China’s total economy has 
shrunk, it still maintains a predominant position in China. The role of the SOEs in the 
Chinese economy has decreased substantially over time as has their status over the private 
sector, accordingly, resulting in the fast growth of the latter. Nevertheless, the CCP is 
facing a dilemma of further opening up the economy or maintaining control over it 
through the SOEs that dominate the vital sectors of the economy.119 Partly in response to 
this, the CCP has adopted the practice of elevating several private enterprises to the status 
of National Champion. 
The National Champions are private Chinese enterprises that are given preferential status 
by the CCP in the form of advantageous policies and access to cheap state-controlled 
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credit in return for supporting the political ambitions of the government and advancing 
the interests of the Communist Party in the Chinese society and allegedly,120 abroad. 
These National Champions include such Chinese giants as Huawei, Alibaba and 
Tencent.121 National Champions are a useful tool for the CCP to advance Chinese 
influence across the globe without the direct participation of the government. Recently 
many Westerners have become worried about the influence the CCP might wield through 
the National Champions if they are allowed to establish themselves firmly into the 
Western economies and infrastructures. The CCP exerts influence over the private sector 
through various means. Good relations with the Party have traditionally been very 
beneficial, if not necessary for private business in China and their relationship has been 
sometimes described as symbiotic.122 Private business owners have been increasingly 
recruited into the Party after the turn of the century and majority of Chinese private 
enterprises have official Party branches in them.123 From the western point of view, the 
CCP presence in Chinese private enterprises raises questions about the level of state 
control over their investment activities abroad and blurs the line between the state-owned 
and private investors.124 A private company, especially one with the status of a National 
Champion often presents similar concerns as a SOE. 
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8. China’s Integration into the Global Economy 
8.1. Thirty Years of Reform 
By the 1980s the West’s technological superiority over the socialist countries had become 
unmistakable. Booming microchip and telecommunications industries in Japan and the 
US made the technological and economic gap between them apparent. This wasn’t lost 
on the Chinese Communist Party and they approached their issues with the stagnated 
economy mainly by implementing market reforms and focusing on liberalising the 
economy. China started liberalising its economy in the aftermath of the cultural 
revolution, but Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in 1992 can be seen as a tipping point in 
China’s transformation from a socialist command economy into what is called a socialist 
market economy.125 Contrary to popular belief, China did not embrace western liberal 
values or even liberal economic principles in their entirety. Chinese leadership realised 
the need for liberal market reforms but sought to implement them in a way that would not 
threaten the authority of the Communist Party of China.126  
By adopting the policy that was coined by the former Chinese premier, Zhu Rongji as 
“grasping the large and letting the small go”,127 the Communist Party gradually allowed 
more private enterprise while maintaining control over industries it sees vital for 
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maintaining control. While some western observers initially saw this as gradual 
abandonment of communism, the more truthful insight came from the former director of 
the China Development Bank, Chen Yuan who famously said to an American political 
scientist that “We are the Communist Party and we decide what communism is.”128 That 
reflects the main principle on which the CCP operates. Its first and foremost objective is 
to maintain the Party’s control over Chinese society and the leadership of the Party is 
required by the first article of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.129 
China´s globalisation was a two-way street. It opened the world for the Chinese and China 
for the rest of the world. In addition to the WTO membership, the reform period saw 
China joining several major international organisations and conventions regulation global 
commerce and developed its domestic regulation to conform to the rules of these 
international organisations. Joining the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more commonly known as the New York Convention130 in 
1987131 was a major step in China´s integration into the global economy. Recognising 
foreign arbitration awards was a key issue for attracting foreign investors and creating 
predictability in international commerce with China. 
China´s integration into the global economy is a continuing process, most recently China 
signed a new trade agreement with Asia-pacific countries called the Regional 
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Comprehensive Economic Partnership132 and the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment with the EU. 
8.2. Foreign Investment Law of China 
Treatment of foreign investments in China is relevant for the European regulatory context 
as investment protection is increasingly becoming reciprocal and the level of European 
access to Chinese markets affect directly the investment treaty negotiations and changes 
in the European regulatory field, regarding the Chinese. Bilateral investment access is 
heavily political and inherently transactional in nature. Understanding the legal 
framework in which European investors have to operate in China is necessary for a 
comprehensive view of the developments in the respective field of law in Europe.  
China used to regulate inward FDI through “Foreign Investment Catalogues” published 
by the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC. In the Catalogue, the Ministry classified 
different industries to be “encouraged,” “restricted,” or “prohibited” for purposes of 
access to foreign investments. Since then, China has moved using a “Negative List” where 
prohibited or restricted industries are included. In 2019 this list included 40 industries, 
where foreign ownership was limited or prohibited altogether.133 On 1 January 2020, The 
Foreign Investment Law of China came into effect.134 The New law embeds the Negative 
List into law and the Ministry of Commerce is currently revising the list to conform to 
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the new requirements of the law. This brings the List under the supervision and approval 
of the State Council of PRC, instead of the earlier, ministerial-level oversight. 
The Negative List has steadily shrunk in size, as China steadily opens up more of its 
industries to foreign investors, but China still maintains foreign equity limitations and 
complete bans on foreign ownership in several key industries in the country, one of which 
is the telecommunications industry, where foreign ownership was limited to 50% still in 
2017.135 Removing these restrictions is a major issue for the EU and US in their trade and 
investment treaty negotiations with China, and this has arguably led to easing of 
restrictions in many sectors, the latest of which being in securities, futures and fund 
management firms,136 it still maintains many restrictive measures to keep foreign 
influence and acquisitions away from the industries in which China seeks to promote their 
domestic enterprises.  
Notably, within China the foreign equity restrictions vary, especially in the Free Trade 
Zones and Special Economic Areas, such as Shanghai, where consequently most of 
Foreign Investment is located. This is combined with many restrictions on foreign 
companies, especially in the technology industry, to operate at all in China. None of the 
American internet giants is allowed to operate in China, partly for security reasons, such 
as maintaining control over China’s internet, and, allegedly, partly for keeping out the 
foreign competition from Chinese companies in their vast domestic markets. This has 
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undoubtedly been a successful strategy in ensuring the evolution of the domestic 
technology industry, as can be seen in the rise of Chinese social media giants, like Weibo 
and TikTok.137 
The Foreign Investment Law will replace existing laws on completely foreign-owned 
enterprises, Chinese-foreign contractual joint ventures, and Chinese-foreign equity joint 
ventures.138 The law was rushed through in three months since it was brought to the 
agenda by Chinese legislators, which is remarkable. The new law is a move towards a 
more open and foreigner-friendly investment environment in China as it addresses many 
of the earlier complaints made by western companies and governments. It provides equal 
treatment of foreign investment, grants foreign investors equal protections, raises them 
on a more level playground with domestic investors.  
Foreign businesses and government have long complained about intellectual property 
rights protection, forced technology transfers and the treatment of foreign companies in 
public procurements in China The new law tackles all these issues, and seemingly puts a 
complete ban on forced technology transfers.139 The new law may help to create a better 
legal environment for foreign investments and investor protection by making legal 
remedies and access to justice more attainable. Above all, the new, unified law 
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streamlines Chinese regulation on foreign investments and makes it easier to understand, 
thereby making doing business in China easier and more predictable.140 
As a critique to the new law, western observers point out the general nature and the 
ambiguousness of the new law, and the fact that it was rushed through the legislative 
process in three months, implying that it was made for political purposes and to act as a 
detente in the current US-China trade war and that its wording is too vague to grant the 
advertised improvements to the overall situation. As Stephen McDonell commented on 
the new law on BBC: “Many in the business community in China see this law as a kind 
of sweeping set of intentions rather than a specific, enforceable set of rules, he says. They 
fear it could be open to different and changing forms of interpretation.”141  
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8.3. The Go Out Policy 
The Go Out, or Go Global, policy is a strategy adopted by the Chinese government under 
the supervision of MOFCOM in 2000 to encourage Chinese enterprises to investment 
abroad at the turn of the century. Like most other new policies, this was also spearheaded 
by the SOEs, which were given the first opportunities to invest overseas.142 Private 
enterprises were given the permission to invest abroad in 2003.143 The following chart 
shows the growth of Chinese OFDI since 2005:144 
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The Go Out policy has been a continuing project ever since its inception. Premier Wen 
Jiabao summarised its aims in the annual report  to the National People´s Congress on 15 
March 2011: “We will accelerate the implementation of the ‘go global’ strategy, improve 
relevant support policies, simplify examination and approval procedures, and provide 
assistance for qualified enterprises and individuals to invest overseas. We will encourage 
enterprises to operate internationally in an active yet orderly manner. We will strengthen 
macro guidance over overseas investments, improve the mechanisms for stimulating and 
protecting them, and guard against investment risks.”145 The policy is a concentrated 
effort by the central government to encourage SOE and private investments abroad and it 
has been supported by active diplomacy by the government to facilitate access to foreign 
markets.146 The Go Out policy goes out to demonstrate how the economy is firmly under 
state guidance and it has been pivotal in China´s growing investments in Europe. 
9. Recent Developments 
9.1. Made in China 2025 
Made in China 2025 is a strategic plan by the NDRC to transform China’s manufacturing 
industry from the world’s factory into global technology leader. The plan seeks to upgrade 
several prioritized sectors of the Chinese industry by improving its manufacturing 
efficiency and promoting Chinese brands by 2025. Unlike China’s previous plans to 
enhance its manufacturing sector, Made in China 2025 focuses primarily on intellectual 
                                                 
145 Davies Ken, China Investment Policy, and update. OECD Working Papers on International Investment 
2013/01 p. 35  
https://www.oecd.org/industry/inv/investment-policy/WP-2013_1.pdf  




property, and investing in research and development. The other aspect of Made in China 
2025 is to make China less reliant on foreign technology. That reliance has become all 
too apparent in 2020 as US banned exports to Huawei and China’s largest semiconductor 
manufacturer Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) in 2020. 
China has a large domestic semiconductor industry, but it is reliant on American software, 
manufacturing equipment and more sophisticated chipsets.147 US dominance in global 
semiconductor industry is a good example on how a technology or industry leader can 
extend its jurisdiction over foreign countries, as non-US companies, even European and 
domestic Chinese companies, risk being cut off from technology or material that is 
indispensable for their business and have to adhere to US policies and laws. 
Made in China 2025 is a fundamental challenge in China´s industrial strategy and it has 
profound impact on future Chinese investment activities in Europe. China is becoming 
more directly challenging the corner stones of European economies with its rapidly 
growing car manufacturing sector and other domestic high complexity production 
capabilities. The strategy specifically targets acquiring foreign R&D to boost domestic 
industry in China.148 
As a part of this plan, China has implemented measures to attract foreign investment in 
these sectors but Chinese investors have also made large investments overseas, from 
acquiring smaller companies for their immaterial property to simply buying the existing 
industry leader in the field. The SOEs have been at the core of these overseas acquisitions 
                                                 
147 Financial Times, China’s biggest chipmaker SMIC hit by US sanctions, 27 September 2020 
https://www.ft.com/content/7325dcea-e327-4054-9b24-7a12a6a2cac6  
148 Zenglein Max, Holzmann Anna, Evolving Made in China 2025 China’s industrial policy in the quest 






such as when China National Chemical Corporation acquired a 95% stake in the Swiss 
agricultural technology company Syngenta for a record $43 billion.149  
Made in China 2025 is relevant for this study as it presents the culmination of the West´s 
fears. Chinese dominance in technology. Guaranteeing fair terms and a level playing field 
for European investors in key in preventing the Chinese companies from gaining an unfair 
competitive advantage over their western counterparts by requiring forced technology 
transfers for access to Chinese markets or having free access to enter European markets 
while being protected domestically.  
9.2. COVID-19 Pandemic 
China reacted quickly and recovered fast from the initial COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan 
and has suffered much lesser economic impact from the pandemic than the European 
Union. European lawmakers quickly became worried about Chinese state-backed 
investors taking advantage of the economic downturn and using it to acquire strategic 
European assets on a discount,150 as studies have shown has happened during earlier 
economic crises in Europe.151 The EU member states increased their screening especially 
on the foreign acquisitions in the health sector.152 The real effects of COVID-19 cannot 
be yet fully determined but will without a doubt leave a significant impact on the world. 
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There is an ongoing debate whether this will lead to less open world, which would 
seriously impact China´s ambitions.153 
In the White Paper released by The European Commission regarding foreign subsidies 
facilitating acquisitions, the COVID-19 is acknowledged to have major, but yet uncertain 
effects on the FDI inflow to the EU.154 The global pandemic has seen the Chinese 
economy fare much better than that of the EU. One reason for the 750-billion-euro EU 
recovery package for COVID-19 is reported to be to protect weakened European firms 
from foreign acquisitions during this economic downturn.155 New FDI screening 
measures were adopted Union-wide in March 2020 and came into force in October. 
According to the White Paper, the scope of application of the FDI Screening Regulation 
is to “determine the likely impact of foreign direct investment on security and public order 
by considering its effects, amongst others, on critical infrastructure, critical technologies, 
critical inputs, and it does not specifically tackle the issue of distortions caused by foreign 
subsidies.” The White Paper also expands the factors to be taken into consideration under 
the FDI screening regulation to include whether the investor is directly or indirectly 
controlled by a foreign government156, which based on the prevalence of SOEs in Chinese 
FDI inflows to Europe has potentially significant implications for them. 
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10. FDI State Subsidies 
State-aid is generally prohibited within the European Single Market. This also applies to 
state aid financing OFDI by European enterprises, as overseas investments tend to 
indirectly strengthen the investors' domestic position against its competition.157 The EU 
cites mostly security concerns in its newfound approach to protect European companies 
from foreign acquisitions carried out "in order to take control of key technologies, 
infrastructure or expertise"158 In international trade state aid and subsidies are subject to 
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) but its scope is 
limited to trade in goods.159  
The White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies adopted by 
the European Commission in June 2020 explore the lack of sufficient regulatory oversight 
and control over some of the distortive effects caused by foreign subsidies in the Single 
Market.160 According to the White Paper, “Subsidies granted by non-EU governments to 
companies in the EU appear to have an increasingly negative impact on competition in 
the Single Market but fall outside EU State aid control.” The key issue under the current 
legislation is that the foreign subsidies must cause direct or indirect distortions to the 
European Single Market and the Commission gives the following definition for foreign 
subsidies that fall under new legal instruments: 
(i) foreign subsidies granted directly to undertakings established in the EU;  
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(ii) foreign subsidies granted to an undertaking established in a third country where 
such subsidy is used by a related party established in the EU; and  
(iii) foreign subsidies granted to an undertaking established in a third country where 
such a subsidy is used to facilitate an acquisition of an EU undertaking or 
participate in public procurement procedures. 
10.1. Chinese State Subsidies in Foreign Direct Investments 
Granting government subsidies and state-aid by EU member states for acquisitions and 
other forms of investments taking place within the EU is generally prohibited by the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 107. However, this rule does 
not apply to non-member states. The EU seeks to address the issues regarding the source 
of funding for Chinese acquisitions and the behaviour of SOEs in the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investment. The EU also adopted a White Paper on foreign subsidies in 
the Single Market on 17 June 2020, which arguably is mostly a response to an increased 
involvement of China’s vast state-owned sector.161 
Chinese investments in the European Union have long been criticised for being funded 
by the Chinese state through direct state-aid or beneficial loans from state-controlled 
banks.162 The involvement of the Chinese government in outgoing investments has raised 
concerns within the EU about the growing influence of the Chinese government in EU 
member states. The Chinese government subsidies and related transparency is a major 
agenda of the Comprehensive Investment Agreement between the EU and PRC. 
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However, as previously mentioned the negotiations have dragged on for years, in summer 
of 2020 EU begun adopting single-sided measures against such state-assisted investments 
on basis of protecting national security interests in the Member States and assuring fair 
competition between EU and Chinese companies, in absence of a negotiated reciprocal 
answer to this concern. China generally denies the accusations about state aid when it 
comes to large FDI projects in Europe, but the general lack of transparency and state 
control over both the investors and financiers makes ascertaining this hard. 
11. Conclusions 
As a final conclusion, a distinct shift in policy towards national security issues regarding 
inward FDI can be observed in the EU. New global challenges have caused the EU to 
adopt these measures and they can clearly be said to be an answer to the rise of China’s 
economic influence. This also serves to increase the role of EU law in cross-border 
investment regulation in the Member States.  
Chinese economic development and increased foreign investments have also led to 
increased pressure on the Chinese to equate the playing field for foreign investors. 
Developments in FDI restrictions rely heavily on which direction other large economies, 
such as China or the US take in their respective jurisdictions. The future of European FDI 
regulation depends heavily on diplomatic relations between China and the EU and global 
political developments. A key issue is whether the Comprehensive Agreement on 
Investment can be finalised or will the EU rely more on unilateral decisions. Currently, 
both China and the EU both seek deeper economic ties and more open trade, but it will 
be seen will the protectionist political developments that have taken root in the UK and 




trade for its plans for the future but the rise of populist governments in Europe might see 
the EU abandoning its traditional economic openness in favour of protectionism. 
The global economic and technological field is changing at an ever-increasing pace. The 
European FDI policy needs to be dynamic to balance the benefits gained from a free-
market economy and capital inflows while maintaining the security and political integrity 
of Europe. Highly functioning regulatory framework and screening methods are at the 
centre of this and at the same time the regulation must not become the sort of red tape 
that stagnated technological and economic advancement but at the same time delivers 
effective protection to vital national security aspects and European economic interests 
from foreign competition exploiting structural weaknesses against European companies 
and to ensure healthy competition. Current regulation allows for restricting FDIs if it 
poses threat to national security, but the definition is a bit vague. Could Chinese 
leadership in some critical fields of technology be a vital security risk in itself and warrant 
a protectionist stance towards domestic industry? Is it within the vital national interests 
of the EU to restrict foreign investments in critical areas where it might outcompete 
domestic enterprises and how EU competition and state aid regulation contradict this?  
The new regulation and policies the EU is adopting FDI rules on foreign subsidies will 
distinctly change the flow of inward FDI from China, which has for the past decade been 
dominated mostly by the SOEs. Limiting the number of Chinese state subsidies and 
bringing the SOEs and real beneficiaries behind foreign companies under effective 
screening is imperative for future European regulatory changes and maintaining the 
competitiveness of European companies in increasingly globalised markets. While the 
attitudes and policies towards liberalisation of international capital flows have been 
subject to considerable controversy, a too rigid and hostile approach will be detrimental 
to both global stability and European economies. Unified European regulation regarding 




stronger EU authorities supervise inward capital flows give better protection from foreign 
entities and large multinational corporations, over which domestic authorities in the 
individual Member States might have little power. 
China poses a challenge to the integrity of the European Single Market as it pursues 
bilateral treaties with the individual Member States instead of dealing with the Union as 
a bloc, like for example in the 17+1 co-operation. The EU faces a challenge to get its 
members to agree on a more unified strategy when it comes to international investment 
and business co-operation to remain a viable economic union for its members in the 
future. The Made in China 2025 poses also an interesting dilemma for European 
lawmakers: the free market legalisation has inarguably helped China, which the EU has 
called a systemic rival, in its path to becoming the future technology leader. This position 
could make Europe path dependent on Chinese technology and would to some extent have 
to accept Chinese political and legal decisions in their regard. On the other hand, adopting 
extensive protectionist legislation would have disastrous consequences. The current 
objective for the EU and its main legislative challenges are to maintain a unified stance 
towards China amongst its member states and to ensure reciprocity in its trade and 
investment relations with China. 
As trade policy is under exclusive EU competence and as EU law generally may be 
applied to restrictions of trade and investment even if a Member Sate uses national 
security reasons to limit these, And individual Member States may cause the EU to be in 
violation of WTO obligations all investment restrictions related to third countries such as 
China should be coordinated at the EU level to ensure unified approach. 
